0817 2015 一On Language as Such and on the Language of Man

Mental being communicates itself in, not through, a language, which means.

On Language as Such and on the Language of Man

Every expression of human mental life can be understood as a kind of language, and this understanding, in the manner of a true method, everywhere raises new questions. It is possible to talk about a language of music and of sculpture, about a language of justice that has nothing directly to do with those in which German or English legal judgments are couched, about a language of technology that is not the specialized language of technicians. Language in such contexts means the tendency inherent in the subjects concerned-technology, art, justice, or religion-toward the communication of the contents of the mind. To sum up: all communication of the contents of the mind is language, communication in words being only a particular case of human language and of the justice, poetry, or whatever underlying it or founded on it. The existence of language, however, is coextensive not only with all the areas of human mental expression in which language is always in one sense or another inherent, but with absolutely everything. There is no event or thing in either animate or inanimate nature that does not in some way partake of language, for it is in the nature of each one to communicate its mental contents. This use of the word "language" is in no way metaphorical. For to think that we cannot imagine anything that does not communicate its mental nature in its expression is entirely meaningful; consciousness is apparently (or really) bound to such communication to varying degrees, but this cannot alter the fact that we cannot imagine a total absence of language in anything. An existence entirely without relationship to language is an idea; but this idea can bear no fruit even within that realm of Ideas whose circumference defines the idea of God. All that is asserted here is that all expression, insofar as it is a communication of contents of the J by its whole innermost I guage. On the other hal necessary to ask of whic to say: the German langl of everything that we co direct expression of that mental entity. It is then~ communicates itself in la distinguished from it. TIi. precisely in its languageinto which all linguistic t precisely over this abyss i and the linguistic entity J study of linguistic theory, it is, rather, the frequent being that constitutes a d of which is found in the paradox has a place, as remains a paradox, and i What does language ~ corresponding to it. It is I itself in language and no speaker, if this means son Mental being communica tha t it is not outwardly identical with linguistic b What is communicable i therefore communicates mental being only insofar insofar as it is capable oj Language communicat festation of this being, h( tion" 1 ( J (' langua§ municates itself." The la not the lamp (for the me ble, is by no means the communication, the lamr the linguistic being of a linguistic theory depends even the appearance of t means, "That which in On this "is" (equivalent t On Language as Such 63 cation of contents of the mind, is to be classed as language. And expression, by its whole innermost nature, is certainly to be understood only as language. On the other hand, to understand a linguistic entity, it is always necessary to ask of which mental entity it is the direct expression. That is to say: the German language, for example, is by no means the expression of everything that we could-theoretically-express through it, but is the direct expression of that which communicates itself in it. This "itself" is a mental entity. It is therefore obvious at once that the mental entity that communicates itself in language is not language itself but something to be distinguished from it. The view that the mental essence of a thing consists precisely in its language-this view, taken as a hypothesis, is the great abyss into which all linguistic theory threatens to fall,l and to survive suspended precisely over this abyss is its task. The distinction between a mental entity and the linguistic entity in which it communicates is the first stage of any study of linguistic theory; and this distinction seems so unquestionable that it is, rather, the frequently asserted identity between mental and linguistic being that constitutes a deep and incomprehensible paradox, the expression of which is found in the ambiguity of the word "logos." Nevertheless, this paradox has a place, as a solution, at the center of linguistic theory, but remains a paradox, and insoluble, if placed at the beginning.
論語言作為這種和
對人的語言
人的心理生活的每一個表情可以理解為一種
語言，這樣的認識，在一個真正的方法的方式，無處不在
提出了新的問題。能夠談論音樂的語言
和雕塑，正義的關於語言，沒有任何直接做
與那些在德文或英文的法律判決的措辭，約
技術的一種語言，不是技術人員的專業語言。
語言在這種背景下意味著固有的學科傾向
關注科技，藝術，正義，或宗教，向通信
心目中的內容。綜上所述：內容的所有通信
心靈是語言，溝通的話暫時只有一個特定的
情況下人類的語言和正義，詩歌，或任何潛在的
它還是建立在其上。語言的存在，但是，是共同延伸不
只與人的心理表達的所有領域中，語言
總是在某種意義上或另一種固有的，但絕對一切。
有在任何生命或無生命的性質，做任何事件或事情
不以某種方式參加語言的，因為它是在每一個的性質
傳達其精神內容。這種用“語言”是在沒有
這樣的隱喻。對於認為我們不能想像任何不
無法溝通的精神本質在其表達完全是有意義的;
意識顯然是（或真）綁定到這種通訊
程度不同，但這不能改變的事實，我們不能總想像
在沒有任何語言。完全是不存在的關係
語言是一個想法;但這種想法可以承受，即使在該領域無果
思想的周長定義神的想法。
所有這一切都在這裡所稱的是，所有的表達，只要它是通信
的殲內容
通過其全最裡面我
瓜哥。另外HAL
要問WHIC
說：德國langl
我們合作的一切
那直接表達
心理實體。它是那麼〜
通信本身在洛杉磯
從中區分。 TII。
正是在其languageinto
所有語言牛逼
正是在這個深淵我
和語言方j
語言學理論研究，
它是，相反，在頻繁
是構成一個d-
其中，在被發現
悖論的地方，如
仍然是一個悖論，我
這是什麼語言〜
對應於它。這是我
本身在語言和無
揚聲器，如果這就是子
心理幸福COMMUNICA
塔牛逼是不向外
用相同的語言b
什麼是傳染性我
因此，通信
心理僅為只要
只要是能夠OJ
語言COMMUNICAT
這之中，H festation（
化“1（j（'langua§
municates本身。“洛杉磯
不是燈（為我
均衡器，絕不是對
通訊，lamr
的一個語言存在
語言學理論依賴
的T甚至外觀
是指，“這裡面的
在這個“是”（相當於牛逼
論語言的這種63
的心態內容陽離子，被歸類為語言。和表達，
其最裡面的整體性質，肯定是可以理解只能作為語言。
另一方面，要理解一個語言實體，它始終是
要問哪個精神實體是直接表達。那是
地說：德語，例如，絕不是表達
一切我們可以-理論上，通過表達，但就是
直接的表現是其本身傳達它。這個“自己”是一個
心理實體。因此很明顯，在一次心理實體
通信本身的語言不是語言本身，而是一件值得
從中區分。這一個事物的精神實質由視圖
正是在它的語言，這種觀點認為，作為一個假說，是偉大的深淵
為所有的語言理論威脅下跌，L和生存能力暫停
正是在這個深淵就是它的任務。精神實體之間的區別
並在其中通信的語言實體是任何的第一階段
語言學理論研究;而這種區別顯得如此毫無疑問，
它，相反，經常精神和語言之間的身份斷言
是構成一個深刻而令人費解的悖論，表達
其中在該單詞的歧義被發現“標誌”。儘管如此，這
悖論有一個地方，作為一個解決方案，在語言學理論的中心，但

仍然是一個矛盾，和不溶性，如果放在開頭。


What does language communicate? It communicates the mental being corresponding to it. It is fundamental that this mental being communicates itself in language and not through language. Languages, therefore, have no speaker, if this means someone who communicates through these languages. Mental being communicates itself in, not through, a language, which means that it is not outwardly identical with linguistic being. Mental being is identical with linguistic being only insofar as it is capable of communication. What is communicable in a mental entity is its linguistic entity. Language therefore communicates the particular linguistic being of things, but their mental being only insofar as this is directly included in their linguistic being, insofar as it is capable of being communicated. Language communicates the linguistic being of things.

 這是什麼語言溝通？它傳達的精神福祉
對應於它。它最根本的是這種心理的存在通信
本身的語言，而不是通過語言。語言，因此，沒有
揚聲器，如果這意味著誰的人通過這些語言相通。
精神之中連通本身，而不是通過一個語言，這意味著
它不具有語言存在向外相同。精神存在是
用相同的語言是僅僅是因為它是能夠溝通的。
什麼是傳染性的精神實體是其語言實體。語言
因此，通信事物的特定語言的存在，但他們的
精神是僅僅是因為這是直接包含在他們的語言之中，
只要它是能夠被傳達。
語言傳達事物的語言之中。

Language communicates the linguistic being of things. The clearest manifestation of this being, however, is language itself. The answer to the question "What does language communicate?" is therefore "All language communicates itself." The language of this lamp, for example, communicates not the lamp (for the mental being of the lamp, insofar as it is communicable, is by no means the lamp itself) but the language-lamp, the lamp in communication, the lamp in expression. For in language the situation is this: the linguistic being of all things is their language. The understanding of linguistic theory depends on giving this proposition a clarity that annihilates even the appearance of tautology. This proposition is untautological, for it means, "That which in a mental entity is communicable is its language." On this "is" (equivalent to "is immediately") everything depends.-Not that I l I 64 On Language as Such which appears most clearly in its language is communicable in a mental entity, as was just said by way of transition, but this capacit~ for communication is language itself. Or: the language of a mental entity IS directly that which is communicable in it. Whatever is communicable of a mental entity, in this it communicates itself. Which signifies that all language communicates itself. Or, more precisely, that all language commUnicates Itself in itself; it is in the purest sense the "medium" of the communication. Mediation which is the immediacy of all mental communication, is the fundamen:al problem of linguistic theory, and if one chooses to call this immediacy magic, then the primary problem of language is its magic. At the same time, the notion of the magic of language points to some.thing else: its infiniteness. This is conditional on its immediacy. For precisely because nothing is communicated through language, what is communicated in language cannot be externally limited or measured, and therefor~ all language contains its own incommensurable, uniquely constituted infinity. Its lingUiStic being, not its verbal contents, defines its frontier. . . . The linguistic being of things is their language; this proposition, ap~hed to man, means: the linguistic being of man is his language. Which slgnlfies: man communicates his own mental being in his language. However, the language of man speaks in words. Man therefore communicates his own mental being (insofar as it is communicable) by naming all other things. But do we know any other languages that name things? It should not be accepted that we know of no languages other than that of man, for this is untrue. We only know of no naming language other than that of man; to identi.fy naming language with language as such is to rob linguistic theory o.f ItS deepest insights.-It is therefore the linguistic being ofman to name thmg~. Why name them? To whom does man communicate himself?-But IS thiS question, as applied to man, different when applied to other commUnications (languages)? To whom does the lamp communicate itself? The mountain? The fox?-But here the answer is: to man. This is not anthropomorphism. The truth of this answer is shown in human knowledge [ErkenntnisJ and perhaps also in art. Furthermore, if the lamp and the mountain and the fox did not communicate themselves to man, how should he be able to name them? And he names them; he communicates himself by naming them. To whom does he communicate himself? Before this question can be answered, we must again inquire: How does man communicate himself? A profound distinction is to be made, a cholce presented, in the face of which an intrinsically false unders~anding of language is certain to give itself away. Does man commUnIcate hiS mental bemg by the names that he gives thing? Or in them? In the paradoxical nature of these questions lies their answer. Anyone who believes that m~n commUnIcates his mental being by names cannot also assume that It IS hiS mental being that he communicates, for this does not happen through the names of things-that is, thrOl equally, the advocate of nicating factual subject I the word by which he de of language, the invalidil clear in what follows. It I its object factual, and it of language, in contrast, communication. It mean cates itself to God. The name, in the rea incomparably high mean The name is that through itself absolutely. In the n language. Where mental absolute wholeness, anI: Name as the heritage of language as such is the IT mental being of man, ale ou t resid ue. On this is fa the language of things. itself, he cannot commur of this intensive totality ( Man is the namer; by t speaks. All nature, insof, language, and so finally give names to things. On beyond himself and attai is completed when thin, name language alone Spt (if the genitive refers to and in this sense certain I of language, and for thi~ speaker (which, however. the name giver: "As man they be called"), many I, Name, however, is no true call of it. Thus, in na to which to express one~ same thing. Language, a purely where it speaks in culminate both the inten: nica ble mental entity, an On Language as Such 65 of things-that is, through the words by which he denotes a thing. And, equally, the advocate of such a view can assume only that man is communicating factual subject matter to other men, for that does happen through the word by which he denotes a thing. This view is the bourgeois conception of language, the invalidity and emptiness of which will become increasingly clear in what follows. It holds that the means of communication is the word, its object factual, and its addressee a human being. The other conception of language, in contrast, knows no means, no object, and no addressee of communication. It means: in the name, the mental being of man communicates itself to God. The name, in the realm of language, has as its sole purpose and its incomparably high meaning that it is the innermost nature of language itself. The name is that through which, and in which, language itself communicates itself absolutely. In the name, the mental entity that communicates itself is language. Where mental being in its communication is language itself in its absolute wholeness, only there is the name, and only the name is there. Name as the heritage of human language therefore vouches for the fact that language as such is the mental being of man; and only for this reason is the mental being of man, alone among all mental entities, communicable without residue. On this is founded the difference between human language and the language of things. But because the mental being of man is language itself, he cannot communicate himself by it, but only in it. The quintessence of this intensive totality of language as the mental being of man is the name. Man is the namer; by this we recognize that through him pure language speaks. All nature, insofar as it communicates itself, communicates itself in language, and so finally in man. Hence, he is the lord of nature and can give names to things. Only through the linguistic being of things can he get beyond himself and attain knowledge of them-in the name. God's creation is completed when things receive their names from man, from whom in name language alone speaks. Man can call name the language of language (if the genitive refers to the relationship not of a means but of a medium), and in this sense certainly, because he speaks in names, man is the speaker of language, and for this very reason its only speaker. In terming man the speaker (which, however, according to the Bible, for example, clearly means the name giver: "As man should name all kinds of living creatures, so should they be called"), many languages imply this metaphysical truth. Name, however, is not only the last utterance of language but also the true call of it. Thus, in name appears the essential law of language, according to which to express oneself and to address everything else amounts to the same thing. Language, and in it a mental entity in it, only expresses itself purely where it speaks in name-that is, in its universal naming. So in name culminate both the intensive totality of language, as the absolutely communicable mental entity, and the extensive totality of language, as the univer­ I l 1 66 On Language as Such sally communicating (naming) entity. By virtue of its communicating nature, its universality, language is incomplete wherever the mental entity that speaks from it is not in its whole structure linguistic-that is, communicable. Man alone has a language that is complete both in its universality and in its intensiveness. In the light of this, a question may now be asked without risk of confusion, a question that, though of the highest metaphysical importance, can be clearly posed first of all as one of terminology. It is whether mental being-not only of man (for that is necessary) but also of things, and thus mental being as such---can from the point of view of linguistic theory be described as of linguistic nature. If mental being is identical with linguistic being, then a thing, by virtue of its mental being, is a medium of communication, and what is communicated in it is-in accordance with its mediating relationship-precisely this medium (language) itself. Language is thus the mental being of things. Mental being is therefore postulated at the outset as communicable, or, rather, is situated within the communicable, and the thesis that the linguistic being of things is identical with the mental, insofar as the latter is communicable, becomes in its "insofar" a tautology. There is no such thing as a content of language; as communication, language communicates a mental entity-something communicable per se. The differences between languages are those of media that are distinguished as it were by their density-that is, gradually; and this with regard to the density both of the communicating (naming) and of the communicable (name) aspects of communication. These two spheres, which are clearly distinguished yet united only in the name-language of man, are naturally constantly interrelated. For the metaphysics of language, the equation of mental with linguistic being, which knows only gradual differences, produces a graduation of all mental being in degrees. This graduation, which takes place within mental being itself, can no longer be embraced by any higher category and so leads to the graduation of all being, both mental and linguistic, by degrees of existence or being, such as was already familiar to Scholasticism with regard to mental being. However, the equation of mental and linguistic being is of great metaphysical moment to linguistic theory because it leads to the concept that has again and again, as if of its own accord, elevated itself to the center of linguistic philosophy and constituted its most intimate connection with the philosophy of religion. This is the concept of revelation.­ Within all linguistic formation a conflict is waged between what is expressed and expressible and what is inexpressible and unexpressed. On considering this conflict, one sees at the same time, from the perspective of the inexpressible, the last mental entity. Now, it is clear that in the equation of mental and linguistic being, the notion of an inverse proportionality between the two is disputed. For this latter thesis runs: the deeper (that is, the more existent and real) the mil whereas it is consistent relation between mind an expression that is linguisti tically the most rounded ;: the same time the purely by the concept of revelatil only and sufficient conditi being that is expressed in concept of revelation) at tl inexpressible. For it is adc tion. In this, however, not it appears in religion, res whereas art as a whole, ir of the spirit of language b consummate beauty. "Lar alpha and omega," says fLanguage itself is not pe sition has a double mear languages of things are iml pure formal principle of la to one another only thrc community is immediate 2 it is magical (for there is al of human language is that and purely mental, and the symbolic fact when it says once life and mind and lar If in what follows the na first chapter of Genesis, 1 su bjection of the Bible to ( discovery of what emerges nature of language; and t purpose, because the prese language as an ultimate re plicable and mystical. The necessarily evolve the fLnd the story of the Creation, 1 man, also reports that man of the Creation, the only expresses his will, which without mediation. In this did not take place through On Language as Such 67 existent and real) the mind, the more it is inexpressible and unexpressed, whereas it is consistent with the equation proposed above to make the relation between mind and language thoroughly unambiguous, so that the expression that is linguistically most existent (that is, most fixed) is linguistically the most rounded and definitive; in a word, the most expressed is at the same time the purely mental. This, however, is precisely what is meant by the concept of revelation, if it takes the inviolability of the word as the only and sufficient condition and characteristic of the divinity of the mental being that is expressed in it. The highest mental region of religion is (in the concept of revelation) at the same time the only one that does not know the inexpressible. For it is addressed in the name and expresses itself as revelation. In this, however, notice is given that only the highest mental being, as it appears in religion, rests solely on man and on the language in him, whereas art as a whole, including poetry, rests not on the ultimate essence of the spirit of language but on the spirit of language in things, even in its consummate beauty. "Language, the mother of reason and revelation, its alpha and omega," says Hamann. 2 Language itself is not perfectly expressed in things themselves. This proposition has a double meaning, in its metaphorical and literal senses: the languages of things are imperfect, and they are dumb. Things are denied the pure formal principle of language-namely, sound. They can communicate to one another only through a more or less material community. This community is immediate and infinite, like every linguistic communication; it is magical (for there is also a magic of matter). The incomparable feature of human language is that its magical community with things is immaterial and purely mental, and the symbol of this is sound. The Bible expresses this symbolic fact when it says that God breathes his breath into man: this is at once life and mind and language.­ If in what follows the nature of language is considered on the basis of the first chapter of Genesis, the object is neither biblical interpretation nor subjection of the Bible to objective consideration as revealed truth, but the discovery of what emerges of itself from the biblical text with regard to the nature of language; and the Bible is only initially indispensable for this purpose, because the present argument broadly follows it in presupposing language as an ultimate reality, perceptible only in its manifestation, inexplicable and mystical. The Bible, in regarding itself as a revelation, must necessarily evolve the fundamental linguistic facts.-The second version of the story of the Creation, which tells of the breathing of God's breath into man, also reports that man was made from earth. This is, in the whole story of the Creation, the only reference to the material in which the Creator expresses his will, which is doubtless otherwise thought of as creation without mediation. In this second story of the Creation, the making of man did not take place through the word: God spoke-and there was. But this i . I I 68 On Language as Such man, who is not created from the word, is now invested with the gift of language and is elevated above nature. This curious revolution in the act of creation, where it concerns man, is no less clearly recorded, however, in the first story of the Creation; and in an entirely different context, it vouches, with the same certainty, for a special relationship between man and language resulting from the act of creation. The manifold rhythm of the act of creation in the first chapter establishes a kind of basic form, from which the act that creates man diverges significantly. Admittedly, this passage nowhere expressl y refers to a relationship either of man or of nature to the material from which they were created, and the question whether the words "He made" envisages a creation out of material must here be left open; but the rhythm by which the creation of nature (in Genesis 1) is accomplished is: Let there be-He made (created)­ He named. In individual acts of creation (Genesis 1:3 and 1:11) only the words "Let there be" occur. In this "Let there be" and in the words "He named" at the beginning and end of the act, the deep and clear relation of the creative act to language appears each time. With the creative omnipotence of language it begins, and at the end language, as it were, assimilates the created, names it. Language is therefore both creative and the finished creation; it is word and name. In God, name is creative because it is word, and God's word is cognizant because it is name. "And he saw that it was good"-that is, he had cognized it through name. The a bsolute relation of name to knowledge exists only in God; only there is name, because it is inwardly identical with the creative word, the pure medium of knowledge. This means that God made things knowable in their names. Man, however, names them according to knowledge. In the creation of man, the threefold rhythm of the creation of nature has given way to an entirely different order. In it, therefore, language has a different meaning: the trinity of the act is here preserved, but in this very parallelism the divergence is all the more striking, in the threefold "He created" of 1:27. God did not create man from the word, and he did not name him. He did not wish to subject him to language, but in man God set language, which had served him as medium of creation, free. God rested when he had left his creative power to itself in man. This creativity, relieved of its divine actuality, became knowledge. Man is the knower in the same language in which God is the creator. God created him in his image; he created the knower in the image of the creator. Therefore, the proposition that the mental being of man is language needs explanation. His mental being is the language in which creation took place. In the word, creation took place, and God's linguistic being is the word. All human language is only the reflection of the word in name. The name is no closer to the word than knowledge is to creation. The infinity of all human language always remains limited and analytic in nature, in comparison to the absolutely unlimited and creative infinity of the divine word. The deepest images of language participates most the point at which it cant human name. The theory between finite and infinite names his own kind, as h( perhaps bold, but scarcely 2:20 in this context: that not found a helper fit for t as he receives her (woman names, parents dedicate th correspond-in a metaph knowledge, for they name ought (in its etymological proper name is the word guaranteed his creation by is expressed by my tho log -infrequently comes true) t the communion of man wi however; man knows a f Through the word, man il word is the name of thin bourgeois view of langua~ relation to its object, that agreed by some convention rejection of bourgeois Ling rests on a misunderstandin sim ply the essence of the t has no word, being created human word. This knowle creation; it does not emerg infinite manner of creation depends on how language God has no t r emained crea receptive to language. Thus of things themselves, from 1 nature, the word of Goc sH For conception and span union only in the linguistic I applies also to that co nee translation of the language found the concept of transh it is much too far-reaching afterthought, as has happen, On Language as Such 69 The deepest images of this divine word and the point where human language participates most intimately in the divine infinity of the pure word, the point at which it cannot become finite word and knowledge, are the human name. The theory of proper names is the theory of the frontier between finite and infinite language. Of all beings, man is the only one who names his own kind, as he is the only one whom God did not name. It is perhaps bold, but scarcely impossible, to mention the second part of Genesis 2:20 in this context: that man named all beings, "but for man there was not found a helper fit for him." Accordingly, Adam names his wife as soon as he receives her (woman in the second chapter, Eve in the third). By giving names, parents dedicate their children to God; the names they give do not correspond-in a metaphysical rather than etymological sense-to any knowledge, for they name newborn children. In a strict sense, no name ought (in its etymological meaning) to correspond to any person, for the proper name is the word of God in human sounds. By it each man is guaranteed his creation by God, and in this sense he is himself creative, as is expressed by mythological wisdom in the idea (which doubtless not infrequently comes true) that a man's name is his fate. The proper name is the communion of man with the creative word of God. (Not the only one, however; man knows a further linguistic communion with God's word.) Through the word, man is bound to the language of things. The human word is the name of things. Hence, it is no longer conceivable, as the bourgeois view of language maintains, that the word has an accidental relation to its object, that it is a sign for things (or knowledge of them) agreed by some convention. Language never gives mere signs. However, the rejection of bourgeois linguistic theory by mystical linguistic theory likewise rests on a misunderstanding. For according to mystical theory, the word is simply the essence of the thing. That is incorrect, because the thing in itself has no word, being created from God's word and known in its name by a human word. This knowledge of the thing, however, is not spontaneous creation; it does not emerge from language in the absolutely unlimited and infinite manner of creation. Rather, the name that man gives to language depends on how language is communicated to him. In name, the word of God has not remained creative; it has become in one part receptive, even if receptive to language. Thus fertilized, it aims to give birth to the language of things themselves, from which in turn, soundlessly, in the mute magic of nature, the word of God shines forth . For conception and spontaneity together, which are found in this unique union only in the linguistic realm, language has its own word, and this word applies also to that conception of the nameless in the name. It is the translation of the language of things into that of man. It is necessary to found the concept of translation at the deepest level of linguistic theory, for it is much too far-reaching and powerful to be treated in any way as an afterthought, as has happened occasionally. Translation attains its full mean­ 70 On Language as Such ing in the realization that every evolved language (with the exception of the word of God) can be considered a translation of all the others. By the fact that, as mentioned earlier, languages relate to one another as do media of varying densities, the translatability of languages into one another is established. Translation is removal from one language into another through a continuum of transformations. Translation passes through continua of transformation, not abstract areas of identity and similarity.

The translation of the language of things into that of man is not only a translation of the mute into the sonic; it is also the translation of the nameless into name. It is therefore the translation of an imperfect language into a more perfect one, and cannot but add something to it, namely knowledge. The objectivity of this translation is, however, guaranteed by God. For God created things; the creative word in them is the germ of the cognizing name, just as God, too, finally named each thing after it was created. But obviously this naming is only an expression of the identity of the creative word and the cognizing name in God, not the prior solution of the task that God expressly assigns to man himself: that of naming things. In receiving the unspoken nameless language of things and converting it by name into sounds, man performs this task. It would be insoluble, were not the name-language of man and the nameless language of things related in God and released from the same creative word, which in things became the communication of matter in magic communion, and in man the language of knowledge and name in blissful mind. Hamann says, "Everything that man heard in the beginning, saw with his eyes, and felt with his hands was the living word; for God was the word. With this word in his mouth and in his heart, the origin of language was as natural, as close, and as easy as a child's game ..." Friedrich Miiller, in his poem"Adams erstes Erwachen und erste selige Nachte" [Adam'S First Awakening and First Blissful Nights], has God summon man to name giving in these words: "Man of the earth, step near; in gazing, grow more perfect, more perfect through the word."3 This combination of contemplation and naming implies the communicating muteness of things (animals) toward the word-language of man, which receives them in name. In the same chapter of the poem, the poet expresses the realization that only the word from which things are created permits man to name them, by communicating itself in the manifold languages of animals, even if mutely, in the image: God gives each beast in turn a sign, whereupon they step before man to be named. In an almost sublime way, the linguistic community of mute creation with God is thus conveyed in the image of the sign.

Since the unspoken word in the existence of things falls infinitely short of the naming word in the knowledge of man, and since the latter in turn must fall short of the creative word of God, there is a reason for the multiplicity of human languages. The language of things can pass into the language of knowledge an, lations, so many languages that knew only one langu: the expulsion from Para paradisiacal language of r whereas later all knowled: plicity of language, was in, as creation in name. Even concea I the fact that the lar were supposed to impart ~ day, God had already cog! that it was good. The kn01 and evil, is nameless. It is v is itself the only evil know and evil abandons name; imitation of the creative w( the Fall marks the birth of -intact and which has steppt edge, from what we may co expressly, as it were extern: thing (other than itself). In t The word as something ext the expressly mediate wore God, and the decay of the between them. For in realit) word that, after the promi externally communicating name, whereas that of gO( Kierkegaard uses the word, elevation, to which the pra judgment. Admittedly, the j evil. Its magic is different judging word expels the fin have arous d it in • ccordan( word punishes- and expeci guilt. In the Fall, since the e purity of the judging word 2 the Fall has a threefold SigI stepping outside the purer" (that is, a knowledge inappl at any rate, a mere sign; an, The second meaning is that of name that was damagec On Language as Such 71 language of knowledge and name only through translation-so many translations, so many languages-once man has fallen from the paradisiacal state that knew only one language. (According to the Bible this consequence of the expulsion from Paradise admittedly came about only later.) The paradisiacal language of man must have been one of perfect knowledge, whereas later all knowledge is again infinitely differentiated in the multiplicity of language, was indeed forced to differentiate itself on a lower level as creation in name. Even the existence of the Tree of Knowledge cannot conceal the fact that the language of Paradise was fully cognizant. Its apples were supposed to impart knowledge of good and evil. But on the seventh day, God had already cognized with the words of creation. And God saw that it was good. The knowledge to which the snake seduces, that of good and evil, is nameless. It is vain in the deepest sense, and this very knowledge is itself the only evil known to the paradisiacal state. Knowledge of good and evil abandons name; it is a knowledge from outside, the uncreated imitation of the creative word. Name steps outside itself in this knowledge: the Fall marks the birth of the human word, in which name no longer lives intact and which has stepped out of name-language, the language of knowledge, from what we may call its own immanent magic, in order to become expressly, as it were externally, magic. The word must communicate something (other than itself). In that fact lies the true Fall of the spirit of language. The word as something externally communicating, as it were a parody-by the expressly mediate word-of the expressly immediate, creative word of God, and the decay of the blissful Adamite spirit of language that stands between them. For in reality there exists a fundamental identity between the word that, after the promise of the snake, knows good and evil, and the externally communicating word. The knowledge of things resides in the name, whereas that of good and evil is, in the profound sense in which Kierkegaard uses the word, "prattle," and knows only one purification and elevation, to which the prattling man, the sinner, was therefore submitted: judgment. Admittedly, the judging word has direct knowledge of good and evil. Its magic is different from that of name, but equally magical. This judging word expels the first human beings from Paradise; they themselves have aroused it in accordance with the immutable law by which this judging word punishes-and expects-its own awakening as the sole and deepest guilt. In the Fall, since the eternal purity of names was violated, the sterner purity of the judging word arose. For the essential composition of language, the Fall has a threefold significance (in addition to its other meanings). In stepping outside the purer language of name, man makes language a means (that is, a knowledge inappropriate to him), and therefore also, in one part at any rate, a mere sign; and this later results in the plurality of languages. The second meaning is that from the Fall, in exchange for the immediacy of name that was damaged by it, a new immediacy arises: the magic of , 72 On Language as Such judgment, which no longer rests blissfully in itself. The third meaning that can perhaps be tentatively ventured is that the origin of abstraction, too, as a faculty of the spirit of language, is to be sought in the Fall. For good and evil, being unnameable and nameless, stand outside the language of names, which man leaves behind precisely in the abyss opened by this question. Name, however, with regard to existing language, offers only the ground in which its concrete elements are rooted. But the abstract elements of language-we may perhaps surmise-are rooted in the word of judgment. The immediacy (which, however, is the linguistic root) of the communicability of abstraction resides in judgment. This immediacy in the communication of abstraction came into being as judgment, when, in the Fall, man abandoned immediacy in the communication of the concrete-that is, nameand fell into the abyss of the mediateness of all communication, of the word as means, of the empty word, into the abyss of prattle. For-it must be said again-the question as to good and evil in the world after the Creation was empty prattle. The Tree of Knowledge stood in the garden of God not in order to dispense information on good and evil, but as an emblem of judgment over the questioner. This immense irony marks the mythic origin of law.

After the Fall, which, in making language mediate, laid the foundation for its multiplicity, linguistic confusion could be only a step away. Once men had injured the purity of name, the turning away from that contemplation of things in which their language passes into man needed only to be completed in order to deprive men of the common foundation of an already shaken spirit of language. Signs must become confused where things are entangled. The enslavement of language in prattle is joined by the enslavement of things in folly almost as its inevitable consequence. In this turning away from things, which was enslavement, the plan for the Tower of Babel came into being, and linguistic confusion with it.


The life of man in the pure spirit of language was blissful. Nature, however, is mute. True, it can be clearly felt in the second chapter of Genesis how this muteness, named by man, itself became bliss, only of lower degree. Friedrich Muller has Adam say of the animals that leave him after he has named them, "And saw by the nobility with which they leaped away from me that the man had given them a name."

After the Fall, however, when God's word curses the ground, the appearance of nature is deeply changed. Now begins its other muteness, which is what we mean by the "deep sadness of nature." It is a metaphysical truth that all nature would begin to lament if it were endowed with language (though "to endow with language" is more than "to make able to speak"). This proposition has a double meaning. It means, first, that she would lament language itself. Speechlessness: that is the great sorrow of nature (and for the sake of her redemption the life and language of man-not only, as is supposed, of the poet-are in nature). This proposition means, second most undifferentiated, imp more than the sensuous bl plants, there is always a L the inversion of this propos the sadness of nature mak( inclination to speechlessne: disinclination to communi, known by the unknowable and blissful-perhaps alwa much more melancholy it is cal language of names, but name has already withered have knowledge of things. l in his creative word, God proper names. In the langue is, in the relation of human be approximately described for all melancholy and (fron muteness. Overnaming as t other curious relation of I, tragic relationship between There is a language of language of poetry is partly, man, it is very conceivable founded on certain kinds of lation of the language of d may still be of the same Sl nonacoustic languages, langl the material community of t Moreover, the communie; that grasps the world as we For an understanding of a them all as languages and tc An example that is appropria is the kinship between song it is certain that the languag relation to the doctrine of sig remains entirely fragmentar sign (of which that between particular example) is origin This provides an opportun the whole sphere of languagl On Language as Such 73 proposition means, second, that she would lament. Lament, however, is the most undifferentiated, impotent expression of language. It contains scarcely more than the sensuous breath; and even where there is only a rustling of plants, there is always a lament. Because she is mute, nature mourns. Yet the inversion of this proposition leads even further into the essence of na ture; the sadness of nature makes her mute. In all mourning there is the deepest inclination to speechlessness, which is infinitely more than the inability or disinclination to communicate. That which mourns feels itself thoroughly known by the unknowable. To be named---even when the namer is godlike and blissful-perhaps always remains an intimation of mourning. But how much more melancholy it is to be named not from the one blessed paradisiacal language of names, but from the hundred languages of man, in which name has already withered, yet which, according to God's pronouncement, have knowledge of things. Things have no proper names except in God. For in his creative word, God called them into being, calling them by their proper names. In the language of men, however, they are overnamed. There is, in the relation of human languages to that of things, something that can be approximately described as "overnaming"-the deepest linguistic reason for all melancholy and (from the point of view of the thing) for all deliberate muteness. Overnaming as the linguistic being of melancholy points to another curious relation of language: the overprecision that obtains in the tragic relationship between the languages of human speakers.


There is a language of sculpture, of painting, of poetry. Just as the language of poetry is partly, if not solely, founded on the name language of man, it is very conceivable that the language of sculpture or painting is founded on certain kinds of thing-languages, that in them we find a translation of the language of things into an infinitely higher language, which may still be of the same sphere. We are concerned here with nameless, nonacoustic languages, languages issuing from matter; here we should recall the material community of things in their communication.

Moreover, the communication of things is certainly communal in a way that grasps the world as such as an undivided whole.

 For an understanding of artistic forms, it is of value to attempt to grasp them all as languages and to seek their connection with natural languages. An example that is appropriate because it is derived from the acoustic sphere is the kinship between song and the language of birds. On the other hand, it is certain that the language of art can be understood only in the deepest relation to the doctrine of signs. Without the latter any linguistic philosophy remains entirely fragmentary, because the relation between language and sign (of which that between human language and writing offers only a very particular example) is original and fundamental.

This provides an opportunity to describe another antithesis that permeates the whole sphere of language and has important relations to the aforemen­ I 74 On Language as Such tioned antithesis between language in a narrower sense and signs, with which, of course, language by no means necessarily coincides. For language is in every case not only communication of the communicable but also, at the same time, a symbol of the noncommunicable. This symbolic side of language is connected to its relation to signs, but extends more widely-for example, in certain respects to name and judgment. These have not only a communicating function, but most probably also a closely connected symbolic function, to which, at least explicitly, no reference has here been made.

These considerations therefore leave us a purified concept of language, even though it may still be an imperfect one. The language of an entity is the medium in which its mental being is communicated. The uninterrupted flow of this communication runs through the whole of nature, from the lowest forms of existence to man and from man to God..Man communicates himself to God through name, which he gives to nature and (in proper names) to his own kind; and to nature he gives names according to the communication that he receives from her, for the whole of nature, too, is imbued with a nameless, unspoken language, the residue of the creative word of God, which is preserved in man as the cognizing name and above man as the judgment suspended over him. The language of nature is comparable to a secret password that each sentry passes to the next in his own language, but the meaning of the password is the sentry's language itself. All higher language is a translation of lower ones, until in ultimate clarity the word of God unfolds, which is the unity of this movement made up of language.


Written in 1916; unpublished in Benjamin's lifetime. Translated by Edmund Jephcott.

 Notes
1. Or is it, rather, the temptation to place at the outset a hypothesis that constitutes an abyss for all philosophizing?
2. Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788), German theologian and philosopher, whose rhapsodic, elliptical style and appeal to affect and intuition led to controversies with eighteenth-century rationalists (Kant among them) but exerted a powerful influence on Herder and the authors of the Sturm und Drang.-Trans.
 3. Friedrich "Maler" Muller (1749-1825), German author, painter, and art critic.­ Trans.


語言傳達事物的語言之中。最明顯的表現
這之中，然而，是語言本身。該問題的答案
“這是什麼語言溝通？”因此，“所有語言相通
本身。“這盞燈的語言，例如，通信
不是燈（用於燈的精神之中，只要它是通信，
決不是燈本身），但語言的燈，在燈
溝通，表達了燈。對於語言的情況是這樣的：
萬物的語言存在是他們的語言。的理解
語言學理論依賴於給這個命題一個清晰的殲
同義反复，甚至出現。這個命題是untautological，它
是指，“這裡面的一個精神實體傳染性是它的語言。”
在這個“是”（相當於“立即”）的一切depends.，這並不是說
一世
升
一世
64在語言作為這樣的
其中表現得最清楚的它的語言是傳染性的精神
實體，如剛剛通過的過渡方式說，但這capacit〜溝通
是語言本身。或：精神實體的語言是直接
這是傳染性的它。無論是精神傳染性
實體，在此它連通本身。這表示所有語言相通
本身。或者，更精確地說，所有的語言進行通信本身
在自身;這是最純粹意義上的通信“中等”。
調解是所有心理溝通的即時性，是
fundamen：語言學理論的人的問題，如果一個人選擇來調用這個
即時魔法，那麼語言的首要問題是它的魔力。在
同時，語言點的魔法some.thing別人的概念：其
無限大。這是有條件的，它的即時性。對於正是因為
沒有什麼是通過語言，什麼是傳達溝通的語言
不能在外部被限制或測量，並為此〜所有語言
包含它自己的不可通約的，構成獨特的無限。它的語言
是，不是它的內容言語，定義了它的邊界。 。 。 。
事物的語言存在是他們的語言;這個命題，AP〜建置
對人，意思是：人的語言存在是他的語言。其中slgnlfies：
通信人自己的精神正在他的語言。然而，該
人的語言講在口頭上。因此，通信人自己的
精神的存在（只要它是通信）通過命名所有其他東西。但
這樣做，我們知道，事物命名任何其他語言？它不應該被接受
據我們所知，沒有任何語言比男人其他，這是不真實的。
我們只知道沒有命名的語言比人等;到identi.fy
命名語言與語言本身就是搶語言學其理論
最深insights.-因此，它是在語言之中ofman僅舉thmg〜。
為什麼他們的名字？誰不溝通的人自己？ - 但就是這個
的問題，適用於男人，不同的時，適用於其他通信
（語言）？誰沒有燈溝通本身呢？山？
？狐狸 - 但這裡的答案是：對人。這不是擬人化。
這個答案的事實顯示在人類知識[ErkenntnisJ
也許還有藝術。此外，如果燈和山和
狐狸沒有溝通自己的人，他應該怎樣才能名字
他們？而他的名字他們;他通過命名他們自己的通信。至
誰不溝通他自己？
在此之前的問題都可以回答，我們必須再次來電諮詢：如何
人溝通自己？深刻的區別是必須作出一個cholce
語言，其中在臉上呈現，本質假und​​ers〜安定
一定是給自己走。難道人傳達他的精神bemg
按他給的東西的名字？還是他們？在似是而非的本質
這些問題就在於他們的答案。任何人誰認為是m〜N通信
他用的名字精神的存在也不能認為這是他的精神
在於他通信，這不會通過名稱發生
的東西，也就是，thrOl
同樣，的倡導者
nicating事實問題，我
由他脫字
語言，在invalidil
明確在什麼如下。據我
它的對象的事實，並且它
語言的，與此相反，
通信。它的意思是
蓋茨自己的神。
這個名字，在REA
無比高的平均
該名稱是通過
本身絕對。在n個
語言。精神在哪裡
絕對的整體性，ANI：
名字作為遺產
語言，因此是在IT
人類，強麥精神的存在
OU牛逼渣油UE。在這個發
事物的語言。
本身，他不能commur
這種密集的總體（
人是納默;經t
說話。所有的性質，insof，
語言，所以最後
給名字的事情。上
超越自己和attai
完成後，當薄，
名語言單獨SPT
（如果所有格指
在這個意義上我一定
語言，以及用於THI〜
揚聲器（其中然而，。
名字送禮：“作為男人
他們被稱為“），很多我，
名，但是，是不
它真正的調用。因此，在缺
到表達一種〜
一樣。語言，一
純粹的地方在講話
既達到高潮的INTEN：
尼加BLE精神實體，一個
論語言的這種65
事情 - 那就是，通過他表示事情的話。而且，
同樣，這種觀點的擁護者可以假定只有人是通信
事實題材其他男人，對於確實發生過
這個詞由他表示事情。這種觀點是資產階級觀念
語言，無效和空虛會越來越
明確在什麼如下。它認為，通信手段是詞，
它的對象的事實，以及其收件人人類。其他概念
語言的，與此相反，是沒有手段，沒有對象，並且沒有收件人
通信。這意味著：在名稱中，人的精神存在通信
自己的神。
這個名字，在語言的領域，作為其唯一目的和
無比崇高的意義，它是語言本身的性質最裡面。
該名稱是通過它，並且其中，語言本身連通
本身絕對。在名稱，即通信本身的精神實體是
語言。凡在其通信精​​神存在是語言本身在其
絕對整體性，只有名稱，只有名稱是存在的。
名稱作為人類語言的傳承，因此先天不足的事實，
語言本身是人的精神存在;只有這個原因是
人的精神存在，單獨所有的精神實體之間，無傳染病
殘留物。在此成立人類語言和之間的差
事物的語言。但由於人的心理存在是語言
本身，他無法通過它進行通信自己，而是只在它。精華
語言的這種密集總體的作為人的精神存在是這個名字。
人是納默;通過這一點，我們認識到，通過他純潔的語言
說話。所有的性質，因為它本身的通信，通信本身
語言，因此終於在人。因此，他是自然和罐的主
給名字的事情。只有通過對事物的語言之中，他可以得到
超越自己和獲得知識的他們，在名稱。神的創造
當事情得到他們的名字從人，從他們在完成
名語言單獨說話。男人可以叫名語言的語言
（如果所有格指的不是一個裝置的關係，但是一個介質），
在這個意義上的肯定，因為他講的名字，男人是音箱
語言，並且正是由於這個原因它的唯一發言人。在terming男人
揚聲器（其中，但是，根據聖經，例如，明確地指
名字送禮：“作為男人應該命名各類眾生，所以要
他們被稱為“），許多語言暗示這種形而上學的真理。
名，但是，是語言不僅最後發聲而且
它真正的調用。因此，在名字出現語言的基本規律，按照
到表達自己，並解決一切達的
一樣。語言，並在它在它的精神實體，只是表達自己
純粹的地方在講話名字，也就是說，在其統一命名。因此，在名
語言高潮雙方的密集整體，作為絕對的傳染性
精神實體，和語言的豐富整體，作為UNIVER
一世
升
1
66在語言作為這樣的
莎莉通信（命名）的實體。憑藉其通信的性質，
其普遍性，語言是不完整的地方精神實體
講，從它不是在其整個結構語言 - 也就是說，傳染性。
只有人有語言，既完成其普遍性和
它的集約化。
在這個光，一個問題現在可以問不混淆的危險，
一個問題是，雖然最高形而上的重要性，可以
明確提出首先是術語之一。它是否是精神
是 - 沒有人只（因為這是必要的），而且還事，因而
心理存在這樣---從看語言學理論的點
描述為語言的性質。如果精神存在是用相同的語言
是，那麼一個東西，憑藉其精神存在的，是一種溝通的媒介，
什麼是傳達它是-按照其中介
的關係，正是這種媒介（語言）本身。語言是這樣
事物的精神之中。因此，心理的存在是假設在一開始就
作為通信，或者，更確切地說，位於可通信範圍內，並且
本文事物的語言存在是相同的精神，只要
因為後者是傳染性，成為它的“只要”同義反复。那裡
沒有這樣的東西作為語言的內容;溝通，語言
傳達一種精神實體的東西傳染性本身。差異
語言之間是那些媒體是有區別的，因為它
是由它們的密度，即，逐漸;與此有關的密度
兩者連通的（命名）和傳染性的（名稱）
通信的各方面。這兩個領域，這是區分清楚
但只有在人的名字語言團結，自然不斷
相互關聯的。
對於語言的形而上學，心理語言學與方程
幸福，哪知道只有逐步的差異，產生的所有畢業
在程度的心理健康。這次畢業，這需要在心理發生
存在本身，可以不再受任何更高的類別，因此導線被接受
所有存在的畢業典禮，既心理和語言，通過度
存在或存在，如已經熟悉到士林有關
精神的存在。然而，心理和語言存在的方程是
偉大的形而上的時刻語言學理論，因為它導致了
概念，具有連連，彷彿它自己的協議，提升自身
語言哲學的中心和構成其最密切的聯繫
與宗教哲學。這是啟示的概念。
在所有語言的形成衝突之間有什麼表示發動
和表達，什麼是難以形容和未表達。在考慮
此衝突，人們看到在同一時間，從難以形容的角度來看，
最後的精神實體。現在，很顯然的方程
心理和語言之中，之間的逆比例的概念
二是有爭議的。對於後一論文運行：更深（即，越
存在和實際）的MIL
而它是一致的
心靈的關係
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創世紀第一章1
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思想和語言徹底明確的關係，從而使
表達式是語言最存在（即，最固定）是語言
最圓的和明確的;在一個字中，最表達是在
同時純粹的精神。然而，這正是指的是什麼
用啟示的概念，如果需要的話不可侵犯的
只有充分條件和精神的神性特徵
正在被表達在它。宗教的最高精神區（中
啟示概念）在同一時間只有一個不知道
難以形容。它是針對在名稱，並表示自身作為啟示。
在此，然而，通知發出，只有最高的精神之中，作為
它出現在宗教，完全在於對人與對語言的他，
而藝術為一體，包括詩歌，不在於對極限本質
語言，但在事情語言的精神，即使在其
精湛之美。 “語言，原因和啟示，母其
阿爾法和歐米茄，“哈曼說。2
語言本身是不完美的表達事物本身。這個命題
有雙重含義，在其隱喻和字面意義：在
事情的語言是不完美的，他們是愚蠢的。東西都否認
語言 - 即，聲音純形式的原則。他們可以溝通
彼此只通過一個或多或少材料社區。此
社區是直接和無限的，像每一個語言交流;
這是神奇的（對於也有一個神奇的物質）。無可比擬的功能
人類的語言是其神奇的社區的事情是不重要
與純粹精神，並在此符號是聲音。聖經表示這
其實象徵時，它說神呼吸他的氣息成男人：這是在
曾經的生活和心靈和語言。
如果在接下來的語言的性質被認為是基礎上
創世紀第一章，對象既不是聖經的解釋，也沒有
聖經服從客觀考慮，因為啟示的真理，但
發現什麼出現的自身從經文是關於
語言的特性;和聖經只是最初成為本
目的，因為現在的說法大致如下它預先假定
語言作為一種最終的現實，只能感知其表現，莫名
和神秘。聖經，就在自己的一個啟示，必須
必然演變的基本語言facts.，第二個版本
創世的故事，它告訴上帝的呼吸呼吸進入
男人，還報告說，男子被從地球上進行。這一點，在整個故事
創作的，唯一的參考材料，其中造物主
表達了他的意願，這是毫無疑問，否則視為創作
沒有調解。在創建這個第二個故事，人的決策
通過這個詞並沒有發生：神說，並有。但是，這
一世
。
一世
一世
68在語言作為這樣的
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在創造，它涉及人的行為這種奇怪的革命，是
毫不遜色明確記載，但是，在創建的第一個故事;而在
一個完全不同的方面，它先天不足，具有相同的確定性，為一個特殊的
男人和創造行為造成語言之間的關係。
創作的行為在第一章規定了多方面的節奏
一種基本形式，從創建人的行為顯著發散。
誠然，這一段無處expressl Y指的關係
自然，從他們所創造的物質要么男人，或者，
而問題的話是否“他做了”設想一個創造出來的
材料必須在這裡敞開;但節奏由創作
自然界（創世記1）完成是：要有，他做了（創建）
他的名字命名。在創作的個人行為（創世紀1：3和1:11）只
詞“要有”發生。在這個“要有”，並在單詞“他
名為“開頭和行為的結束，深而清晰的關係
創作行為語言每次出現。隨著創意無所不能
語言它開始，並在結束時的語言，因為它是，同化
創建的，它的名字。因此，語言是兼具創意和成品
創作;它是單詞和名稱。在神的名字是創造性的，因為它是字，
與神的話語是認識，因為它是名字。 “他看到，這是
好“，也就是說，他通過名稱認定它。的一個bsolute關係
名知識只存在於神。唯一有名字，因為它是
內心有相同的字創意，知識的純介質。
這意味著，上帝使事情在可知他們的名字。男人，然而，
根據知識的名字他們。
在人的創造，創造自然的三重節奏有
讓位給一個完全不同的順序。在這裡面，因此，語言具有
不同的含義：行為的三位一體被保存在這裡，但在這個非常
並行的分歧更加引人注目，在三重“他
創造了1:27。“上帝沒有從字創建人，他沒有
他的名字。他不希望他受到語言，但在神人組
語言，曾擔任他作為媒介創作的，免費的。上帝休息
當他離開了他的創作力量，以自己的男人。這個創意，解除
其神聖的現實，成為知識。人是在同一個能知
語言上帝是創造者。上帝創造了他自己的形象;他
創作者的形象創造了能知。因此，命題
人類的精神存在是語言需要解釋。他的精神
幸福是在創作發生的語言。在這個詞，創作
發生了，上帝的語言存在這個詞。所有人類語言
在名稱字只反映。的名字是沒有接近字
比知識是創造。所有人類語言的無限性總是
仍然有限和分析性的，相較於絕對
無限創意無限神聖的詞。
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在其中它不能點
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語言參與最密切的純文字的神聖無窮大，
在該點它不能成為有限字和知識，是
人的名字。專名的理論是前沿理論
之間的有限與無限的語言。一切眾生，人是唯一一個誰
名字他自己的那種，因為他是唯一一個人，上帝沒有名字。這是
也許是大膽的，但幾乎是不可能的，更何況創世紀的第二部分
2:20這樣的背景下：那個男人叫眾生“，但對於男人有
沒有找到一個配偶幫助他。“因此，亞當的名字他的妻子很快
當他收到她（女子在第二章中，夏娃在第三）。通過給予
姓名，父母奉獻自己的孩子給上帝;他們給出的名稱不
對應-的形而上學，而不是詞源學意義上，任何
知識，因為他們的名字新生兒。在嚴格的意義上說，沒有名字
應該（在其詞源的意思），以對應於任何人，對於
正確的名稱是神在人類聲音的話。通過它的每個人都是
保證他的創作神，在這個意義上，他是自己創作的，如
由神話智慧的想法表示（其中無疑不
很少成真），一個人的名字是他的命運。正確的名稱是
人與神的創意字共融。 （不是唯一的一個，
然而，男人知道上帝的話進一步交流的語言。）
通過字，男人勢必事物的語言。人類
字是事物的名稱。因此，它不再是可以想像的，作為
語言的資產階級觀點認為，這個詞有一個意外
相對於它的對象，其是用於事物的符號（或他們的知識）
同意一些約定。語言從來沒有給單純的跡象。然而，該
拒絕資產階級語言學理論的受神秘的語言學理論同樣
建立在一種誤解。根據神秘理論，這個詞
簡單的事物的本質。即是不正確的，因為在它本身的東西
有沒有字，正在從神的話語創造並通過在其名稱中已知的
人字。的東西這方面的知識，但是，是不是自發的
創作;它不會從語言的絕對無限的出現，
創造無限的方式。相反，那名男人給語言
取決於如何語言傳達給他。在名，字
上帝並沒有保持創造性;它已成為一個部分接受，即使
容易接受的語言。因此受精，它的目的是生出的語言
的事物本身，從這反過來，無聲，在靜音魔
自然，上帝的話，照等等。
對於概念和自發性在一起，這是發現在這個獨特的
僅在語言學領域的結合，語言都有自己的字，並且這個詞
也適用於在名稱中無名的立意。它是
翻譯的東西的語言成為人類的。有必要
發現翻譯的概念，在語言學理論的最深層次，為
它是太深遠而強大以任何方式被視為
事後，因為已經發生偶爾。翻譯達到其全部意思
70在語言作為這樣的
荷蘭國際集團中實現，每一個演變語言（除的
上帝的話）可以考慮所有其他的翻譯。由以下事實
即，如前面提到的，語言的相互關係如做媒體
不同密度，語言的譯入互相建立。
翻譯是去除從一種語言到另一種通過
連續變換。翻譯經過連續統的
變換，同一性和相似性的不抽象領域。
事物的語言進入那人的翻譯，不僅是
靜音成聲波的翻譯;它也是在翻譯
無名到名。因此，它是一個不完美的語言的翻譯
成為一個更完美的，而不能不加的東西給它，即
知識。這個翻譯的客觀性，但是，通過保障
上帝。對於上帝創造的東西;創造性的字是他們的胚芽
認知的名字，就像上帝，也終於命名為每一件事情後，這是
創建。但顯然這種命名僅僅是身份的表達
創意Word和上帝的認知名稱，而不是之前的解決方案
上帝明確分配任務到人自己：即事物命名。
在接受事物的潛無名的語言，並把它轉換
名成聲音，男人執行此任務。這將是不溶性的，不
名稱語言的人，並在相關的事物。無名語言
上帝和來自同一個詞的創作發表，這事成了
無論在魔術交流溝通，並在人類語言
在幸福的心靈知識和名稱。哈曼說：“這一切
聽到的人在一開始，只見他的眼睛，感覺到他的手是
活著的話。因為神的話。有了這個詞在他的嘴裡和
在他的心臟，語言的起源是自然，親和一樣簡單
孩子的遊戲...“弗里德里希米勒，在他的詩”亞當斯erstes Erwachen
UND ERSTE selige Nachte“[亞當的第一個覺醒與第一德佑之夜]
已經神召喚男人的名字給這些話：地球的“人，
步驟附近;在凝視，變得更加完美，更完美的通過話。“3
沉思和命名的這種組合意味著通信
東西（動物）的失語朝文字語言的人，這
他們的名字接收。在這首詩的同一章，詩人表達
只有一句話，從哪些東西創建許可證實現
男人他們的名字，在百般的語言溝通本身
動物，即使無聲，圖像中的：上帝賦予每個獸又一個跡象，
於是，他們人面前步驟進行命名。在一個幾乎崇高的方式，
靜音創造與上帝的語言社區因此在輸送
形象的標誌。
由於潛字的事物的存在屬於短期無限
在人的知識的命名字的，並且由於後者反過來
必須虧缺了神的創造詞，是有原因的
多重人類語言。事物的語言可通入
知識的語言，
辦法第十四，這麼多的語言
那知道只有一種語言翻譯：
驅逐來自帕拉
為r的天堂般的語言
而後來的所有knowled：
語言起見，在，
作為創作的名字。甚至
concea我的事實，拉爾
被認為傳授〜
一天，上帝已經凸榫！
這是很好的。該kn01
與邪惡，是無名的。它為v
本身就是惡知道
和邪惡放棄名稱;
模仿創新的W（
秋季標誌著誕生
-intact並且其具有steppt
邊，從我們可以合作
明確，因為它是EXTERN：
事（除其自身以外）。在T
這個詞的東西EXT
在明確中介穿著
神和的衰變
在他們中間。對於realit）
字，該PROMI後
外部溝通
名，而該走（
克爾凱郭爾使用單詞，
抬高，到了PRA
判斷。誠然，第j
邪惡。它的魔力是不同的
判斷詞驅逐鰭片
有阿魯斯ð它•ccordan（
字punishes-和expeci
愧疚。到了秋天，由於電子
評審字2的純度
秋季有三重SIGI
素淨“外步進
（即，一個知識inappl
在任何速率，僅僅標誌;一，
第二個含義是，
那是damagec名
論語言的這種71
知識和名稱只能通過翻譯，這麼多的翻譯語言，
如此多的語言，一旦男人已經從天堂般的狀態下降
是只知道一種語言。 （根據聖經這個後果
驅逐從天堂來到不可否認只左右以後）的
男人的天堂般的語言必須是完美的知識之一，
而之後所有的知識是無限的再次分化的多樣性
語言的，確實被迫區分自己在一個較低的水平
作為創作的名字。知識樹甚至存在無法
隱瞞事實天堂的語言充分認識。其蘋果
被認為賦予善和惡的知識。但在第七
一天，上帝已經認定與創造的話。神看
這是很好的。到蛇引誘的知識，那好
與邪惡，是無名的。這是徒勞的深層意義，而這很有學問
本身是已知的天堂般的狀態中唯一的罪惡。知識的好
和邪惡放棄名稱;它是來自外部的知識，非受造
模仿創新詞。在命名這個知識本身以外的步驟：
秋季標誌著人類詞的誕生，在這名不再生活
完好並已步出名稱語言，知識的語言，
從我們可以調用它自己的內在魔力，才能成為
明確，因為它是在外部，魔術。這個詞必須傳達的東西
（自身以外）。在這個事實就在於語言的精神的真正墮落。
這個詞作為外部的東西溝通，因為它是一個模仿，由
在明確中介口碑的明確直接的，創造性的字
神，和語言的幸福亞當之前精神的腐朽站
在他們中間。對於現實中存在的一個根本的身份
消息說，蛇的承諾後，知道善惡，以及
外部溝通字。事物的知識駐留在
名字，而那善惡是，在深刻的意義上，
克爾凱郭爾使用這個詞，“閒聊”，並且知道只有一個淨化和
抬高，到了空談的人，罪人，因此被提交：
判斷。誠然，在判斷詞具有良好的直接知識和
邪惡。其神奇的是不同於名稱，但同樣神奇。此
判斷詞驅逐來自天堂的第一人;他們自己
已經引起了按照不可改變的法則通過此判斷
字懲罰-並預計，其自身的覺醒作為唯一的和最深切的
愧疚。到了秋天，由於名字的永恆純潔被侵犯時，嚴厲
判斷單詞的純度產生。對於語言的基本組成，
秋季有三重意義（除了其其他含義）。在
名越純語言外步進，使得人的語言手段
（即，一個知識不適當他），並因此也，在一個部分
在任何速率，僅僅標誌;及在所述多個語言這以後的結果。
第二層意思是，從秋天，換來了直接
那是由它破壞名字，一個新的即時出現了：魔術
，
72在語言作為這樣的
判斷，不再幸福地自行掌握。第三個含義
或許可以暫時冒險是抽象的起源，也一樣，
語言精神的教師，就是要尋求在秋季。對於好
邪惡的，是難以名狀的和無名的，站名的語言外，
這名男子留下恰恰在打開的這個問題，深淵。
名，但是，對於現有的語言，只提供地面
其中它的具體內容是植根。但語言，我們的抽象元素
也許猜測，是植根於審判的話。該
即時性（其中，然而，就是語言的根）的傳染性的
抽象居住在判決。這在即時通信
抽象應運而生作為判斷的時候，在秋季，男人拋棄
直接在混凝土 - 即通信，nameand
下跌的字變成所有通信的mediateness的深淵，
空字，進入閒聊的深淵為手段，。換必須說