2014年3月28日 星期五

0328 2014 五



半夜看一部殺無赦Unforgiven

所以10點半才起床。第一次日文課缺席，實在離譜。

晚餐春風微笑請燕回國540 終於踏出國門。

晚上defriend 同學林康。
















許久沒參加文學院音樂會。現在說明都採用雙面彩色印刷。

實際有 呂女士幫忙翻譯....

No.170 文學院音樂會──Raga Beats──印度塔布拉鼓演奏




點擊圖片可瀏覽相關圖片
最新1期《經濟學人》(Economist)以〈懸在兩難的鹿茸上－台灣總統馬英九的雄心與公眾對中國的疑心相衝撞〉為題，分析馬英九期待留下穩定的兩岸 關係，被雙方人民視為英雄的夢想看來是要失望收場。圖:翻攝網路
新頭殼newtalk2014.03.28 洪聖斐/編譯報導

318學運持續成為國際媒體關心的焦點。最新1期《經濟學人》(Economist)以〈懸在兩難的鹿茸上－台灣總統馬英九的雄心與公眾對中國的疑心相衝撞〉為題，分析馬英九期待留下穩定的兩岸關係，被雙方人民視為英雄的夢想看來是要失望收場。

《經濟學人》這篇分析報導提到，馬可能是受到在兩岸都受到尊崇的孫文啟發，期待能藉著扮演促成歷史性和解的領導者角色，受到雙方人民的懷念。然而，台灣與 中國的和解依舊非常遙遠。曾經是國民黨內最受歡迎政治人物的馬英九，在去年秋天的民調跌到個位數，被反對黨譏笑為「9趴總統」。

這篇報導描述，馬英九跟中國政治局任何1位國務委員一個樣，頭髮梳理整齊、光鮮亮麗。坐在台北總統府受訪的他，也和那些中南海的領導人一樣，不願意承認有任何策略上的根本缺陷。

這篇報導指出，改善對中國關係一直是馬政府的施政核心。在與中國簽定21項協議後，馬英九下一步想要的是馬習會。馬英九希望能在APEC與習近平會晤。畢 竟APEC的會員是經濟體，而不是國家。香港也是APEC的會員，所以兩岸領導人在APEC見面，比較不會挑戰中國把台灣視為一個省的立場。在中方提出異 議後，馬表示在其他地方會晤，也不是不可能。

這篇報導分析，此事也解釋了目前台灣反服貿抗議欲動並非只是單純的本地問題。學生佔領國會的行動與反服貿的論述，反映出大眾對於馬英九本人以及對兩岸經濟統合的高度不信任。抗議群眾把馬英九描繪成中國的丑角，還要尋找失蹤老人馬英九。他的鹿茸是鹿耳毛之說也成為笑柄。

馬英九說人民很支持馬習會，但民進黨的吳釗燮卻宣稱此舉事實上只會讓國民黨在2016年總統大選受傷。馬英九說在他任內對美關係是1979年(台美斷交) 以來最好的階段，但其他人都很懷疑。當美國要「重返亞洲」時，甚少提到對台灣的承諾。相反地，「棄台論」卻不時出現在各種刊物上。

這篇報導結論時指出，馬英九試圖在失敗主義和冒進主義間走1條中間路線，但台灣人民似乎對他相當有戒心。台灣人民的現實主義傾向以及民進黨的自相殘殺，或許會使2016年的總統又是國民黨人，但馬英九留下歷史地位的美夢，大概是要失望收場了。

On the antlers of a dilemma
The ambitions of Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s president, collide with popular suspicion of China Mar 29th 2014 | From the print edition




THE fresh-faced good looks have been lined and drawn by the cares of office. His immaculate English is forsaken for the dignity of immaculate Mandarin. Patient replies to questions come wearily, as if said many times before. Yet, six years into his presidency, Ma Ying-jeou’s hair remains as lush and jet-black as any Chinese Politburo member’s. And, speaking in the presidential palace in Taipei, he remains as unwilling as any leader in Beijing to admit to any fundamental flaws in strategy.

Perhaps Mr Ma draws inspiration from his portrait of Sun Yat-sen, founder of his ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), and, in 1912, of the Republic of China to which Taiwan’s government still owes its name. Sun is revered as a nationalist hero not just by the KMT but, across the Taiwan Strait, by the Chinese Communist Party too. Mr Ma may also hope to be feted on both sides of the strait—in his case as a leader responsible for a historic rapprochement. For now, however, reconciliation between Taiwan and China remains distant. And Mr Ma, once the KMT’s most popular politician, is taunted by opponents as the “9% president”, a reference to his approval ratings in opinion polls last autumn.
In this section
Manning the trade barriers
Seasons of abundance
Lost
Runners and riders
The big squeeze
On the antlers of a dilemma
Reprints
Related topics
Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan)
International relations
Political policy
Diplomacy
Economic integration

Improving relations with China has been the central theme of his administration, after the tensions of eight years of rule by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which leans towards declaring formal independence from the mainland. Mr Ma can boast of 21 agreements signed with China. He reels off the numbers of two fast-integrating economies: a tenfold increase in six years in mainland tourists to Taiwan, to 2.85m in 2013; cross-strait flights from none at all to 118 every day; two-way trade, including with Hong Kong, up to $160 billion a year.

China’s strategy to reabsorb Taiwan is plain. As the island’s economy becomes more intertwined with that of the vast mainland, China thinks, resistance to unification will wane. Then Taiwan becomes an “autonomous” part of China—like Hong Kong, though allowed its own army. Taiwan will return to the motherland without resort to the missiles and increasingly powerful armed forces ranged against it. But as Mr Ma sees it, cross-strait “rapprochement” is a first line of defence against Chinese aggression, since “a unilateral move by the mainland to change the status quo by non-peaceful means would come at a dear price”. Politics in Taiwan is framed as a debate about independence or unification but is really about preserving the status quo.

The next step in rapprochement with China would be a meeting between political leaders. In February in Nanjing, once the capital of a KMT government of all China, ministers from China and Taiwan held their first formal meeting since 1949. Mr Ma hoped to meet China’s president, Xi Jinping, in Beijing this November, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) summit. To accommodate Hong Kong and Taiwan, APEC’s members are not “countries” but “economies”. So Mr Xi and Mr Ma could meet as “economic leaders”, sidestepping the tricky protocol that usually dogs relations, with China viewing Taiwan as a mere province. The Chinese demurred. But Mr Ma thinks a meeting somewhere is “not outside the realm of possibility”.

This backdrop explains why a protest movement against a services-trade agreement with the mainland is more than a little local difficulty for Mr Ma. Students occupying parliament have resorted to undemocratic means, and many of the arguments they and the DPP make about the trade agreement are specious. But they have tapped a vein of popular mistrust of Mr Ma and of economic integration with the mainland. A split persists between native Taiwanese, on the island for generations, and mainlanders, like Mr Ma, whose families came over as the KMT lost the civil war in the 1940s. Protesters portray Mr Ma as either a mainland stooge or as clueless and out of touch. In the occupied parliament, student caricatures give him antlers, a reference to a slip he once made when he appeared to suggest that the deer-antlers used in Chinese medicine were in fact hair from the animal’s ears.

Mr Ma says public opinion supports a “Ma-Xi” summit. Joseph Wu of the DPP, however, claims such a meeting would actually damage the KMT in the next presidential election, due in 2016; rather, he says, Mr Ma is trying to leave a personal legacy. The DPP’s lead in the polls alarms not just the Chinese government but also America, which could do without another flare-up in a dangerous region. The stronger China grows, the more Taiwan’s security depends on commitments from America. It switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing in 1979, but Congress then passed a law obliging it to help Taiwan defend itself.

All political lives end…

Mr Ma says relations with America are better than they have ever been at least since 1979 and perhaps before. Others are doubtful. In all the talk of America’s “pivot” to Asia, its promises to Taiwan are rarely mentioned. Many in Taiwan paid attention when John Mearsheimer, an American academic, suggested in the National Interest, a policy journal, that there is “a reasonable chance American policymakers will eventually conclude that it makes good strategic sense to abandon Taiwan and to allow China to coerce it into accepting unification.” For some, abandonment is a fact of life and unification a matter of time. “No one is on our side strategically, diplomatically, politically; we have to count on China’s goodwill,” an academic in Taipei argues.

Mr Ma has tried to steer what seems a sensible middle course between such defeatism and the adventurism of those in the DPP who would like to confront and challenge China. But he sounds weary with the effort, and Taiwan’s people seem weary of him. Their pragmatism and the DPP’s internecine strife may yet see them elect another KMT president in 2016. But if Mr Ma hoped to leave office with cross-strait relations stabilised, and with his own role as an historic peacemaker recognised on both sides and around the world, he seems likely to be disappointed. - See more at: http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21599812-ambitions-ma-ying-jeou-taiwans-president-collide-popular-suspicion-china#sthash.74E8Fq3f.dpuf



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